How Big Are CRLs That Are Found In The Wild?


  • Wed 31 July 2024
  • misc

A week ago I wrote an article about LetsEncrypt ending OCSP service.

After reflecting on my surprise at the CRL for LetsEncrypt being so small, several people asked me about the CRLs for other CAs. After all, CRLs are stereotypically big and clunky and OCSP was developed to address this problem (transmitting the same information but only in small chunks on demand), so they must be huge, right?

It turns out that CRLs that we're interested in don't go with the root CA (the one that's in your browser trust store), they go with the subordinate (or "intermediate") CA that directly signs certificates for end users (or web servers if you like). This poses a problem because it means that you can't just dump out your browser trust store and go looking for CRL distribution endpoints. A cursory check of the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements didn't find a requirement for using subordinate CAs in order to be in a broswer trust store, but as a matter of risk management and good hygiene everyone seems to do this. Indeed, I've seen auditors ding an enterprise CA for not having an intermediate, so it must be hardcoded as a best practice requirement somewhere, by someone, I just don't know who or where offhand.

My friend Jose Nazario was able to come up with a list of CRL endpoints for the top 50 most popular intermediate CAs seen recently in the wild, and we report on them here as a snapshot in time as of today, 2024-07-31.

Note that we are currently experiencing an anomaly in the DigiCert ecosystem which will result in unusually high numbers for DigiCert CRLs until certs fall off the CRL via the natural expiration process. Note too that the vast majority of the CRLs go back slightly longer than 13 months, which comports with the maximum browser cert lifetime currently offered. As I pointed out a week ago, there is little point in including revoked certificates that would appear invalid even without a CRL as their lifetime has expired.

The interesting number here when countering the "CRLs are clunky" argument is the "Download Size" field (measured in bytes). The largest download we found was 15.6 megabytes, but that was quite an outlier; the next runner up was 12.3 megabytes, the median was 89.7 kilobytes, and the smallest was 337 bytes - four of the 50 most popular CAs had no revoked certs in their CRLs.

In 2024 even the largest CRLs are smaller than many ad impressions. Between shorter maximum certificate validity time and the proliferation of much faster bandwidth than when PKI was designed, CRLs do not represent a scale problem anymore. Since they are cryptographically signed by their issuer, they may be distributed (even unencrypted - it seems that distribution of the CRLs themselves has escaped the "we must encrypt all the things" zeitgeist, no doubt in order to avoid circular dependencies) via a CDN with no erosion of trust if scaling on the distribution side is a concern.

URL Common Name Count Download Size Revoked Count Oldest Date Newest Date
http://crl.r2m02.amazontrust.com/r2m02.crl Amazon RSA 2048 M02 16472403 577376 16481 2023-06-25T00:16:24Z 2024-07-31T07:57:24Z
http://crl.r2m03.amazontrust.com/r2m03.crl Amazon RSA 2048 M03 16471425 514747 14692 2023-08-03T18:16:28Z 2024-07-31T08:17:12Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/DigicertSHA2SecureServerCA-1.crl DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA 6956117 9321814 266239 2023-06-23T13:01:07Z 2024-07-30T20:40:32Z
http://crl4.digicert.com/DigicertSHA2SecureServerCA-1.crl DigiCert SHA2 Secure Server CA 6956117 9321814 266239 2023-06-23T13:01:07Z 2024-07-30T20:40:32Z
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Azure%20RSA%20TLS%20Issuing%20CA%2004.crl Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 04 6202342 11341 203 2023-12-14T20:29:13Z 2024-07-31T17:33:59Z
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Azure%20RSA%20TLS%20Issuing%20CA%2003.crl Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 03 6196136 10925 195 2023-12-14T20:29:13Z 2024-07-31T17:34:00Z
http://crl.comodoca.com/cPanelIncCertificationAuthority.crl cPanel, Inc. Certification Authority 5524876 66722 1863 2023-07-28T19:53:02Z 2024-07-31T01:14:07Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl Cloudflare Inc ECC CA-3 4404958 337 2 2024-05-27T15:35:40Z 2024-05-27T15:37:09Z
http://crl4.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl Cloudflare Inc ECC CA-3 4404958 337 2 2024-05-27T15:35:40Z 2024-05-27T15:37:09Z
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Azure%20RSA%20TLS%20Issuing%20CA%2007.crl Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 07 4056465 13577 246 2023-12-14T22:59:12Z 2024-07-31T17:35:56Z
http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Azure%20RSA%20TLS%20Issuing%20CA%2008.crl Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 08 3988623 9105 160 2023-12-14T22:59:29Z 2024-07-29T18:25:21Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/CloudflareIncRSACA-2.crl Cloudflare Inc RSA CA-2 2206586 457 0
http://crl4.digicert.com/CloudflareIncRSACA-2.crl Cloudflare Inc RSA CA-2 2206586 457 0
http://validation.identrust.com/crl/hydrantidcao1.crl HydrantID Server CA O1 2065390 293420 6185 2023-07-10T15:57:21Z 2024-07-31T20:46:44Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/GeoTrustGlobalTLSRSA4096SHA2562022CA1.crl GeoTrust Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1 1706768 25299 653 2023-07-03T16:33:18Z 2024-07-30T03:06:08Z
http://crl4.digicert.com/GeoTrustGlobalTLSRSA4096SHA2562022CA1.crl GeoTrust Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1 1706768 25299 653 2023-07-03T16:33:18Z 2024-07-30T03:06:08Z
http://igcgfti-ca1.francetelecom.com/crl/orangedevices_stellar_auth3_ca.crl Orange Devices Auth Stellar 3 CA 1664067 1763 14 2017-09-06T09:10:07Z 2017-09-15T08:28:19Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/CiscoMerakiCA.crl Cisco Meraki CA 1201214 452 0
http://crl4.digicert.com/CiscoMerakiCA.crl Cisco Meraki CA 1201214 452 0
http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertGlobalG2TLSRSASHA2562020CA1-1.crl DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1 1179284 12345792 341353 2023-06-24T16:41:40Z 2024-07-31T20:36:52Z
http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertGlobalG2TLSRSASHA2562020CA1-1.crl DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1 1179283 12230166 338797 2023-06-23T07:50:27Z 2024-07-30T20:36:17Z
http://crl.digicert.cn/DigiCertBasicRSACNCAG2.crl DigiCert Basic RSA CN CA G2 1110268 2702 60 2023-07-12T01:49:17Z 2024-07-16T02:36:03Z
http://crl.sectigo.com/SectigoRSAOrganizationValidationSecureServerCA.crl Sectigo RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA 1045321 2925385 80227 2022-07-19T12:42:03Z 2024-07-31T01:33:29Z
http://crl.microsoft.com/pkiinfra/CRL/AME%20Infra%20CA%2006.crl AME Infra CA 06 715739 105127 2006 2023-08-11T21:17:00Z 2024-07-26T00:42:51Z
http://crl.microsoft.com/pkiinfra/CRL/AME%20Infra%20CA%2002(4).crl AME Infra CA 02 715162 103116 1967 2023-09-01T02:28:38Z 2024-07-29T02:16:52Z
http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertTLSRSASHA2562020CA1-4.crl DigiCert TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1 590903 2099582 59211 2023-06-26T15:53:05Z 2024-07-30T22:18:37Z
http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertTLSRSASHA2562020CA1-4.crl DigiCert TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1 590903 2099582 59211 2023-06-26T15:53:05Z 2024-07-30T22:18:37Z
http://crl.microsoft.com/pkiinfra/CRL/AME%20Infra%20CA%2005.crl AME Infra CA 05 538817 89579 1707 2023-08-25T20:55:00Z 2024-07-26T00:42:58Z
http://crl.microsoft.com/pkiinfra/CRL/AME%20INFRA%20CA%2001(4).crl AME INFRA CA 01 526542 89700 1709 2023-09-01T02:36:23Z 2024-07-26T00:43:04Z
http://crl06.actalis.it/Repository/AUTHDV-G3/getLastCRL Actalis Domain Validation Server CA G3 422592 447772 10794 2023-07-04T06:41:09Z 2024-07-31T20:36:04Z
http://cdp.rapidssl.com/RapidSSLTLSRSACAG1.crl RapidSSL TLS RSA CA G1 330495 393649 10794 2023-06-27T17:01:43Z 2024-07-31T03:31:39Z
http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSAOrganizationValidationSecureServerCA.crl COMODO RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA 325173 15606255 439248 2022-07-18T17:33:37Z 2024-07-31T01:18:28Z
http://crl.entrust.net/level1k.crl Entrust Certification Authority - L1K 281758 3260187 77857 2023-06-30T17:27:14Z 2024-07-31T22:57:41Z


We found several CRL endpoints which were not resolvable - in each case because they had a TLD that was nonexistent.

The most popular was http://pki-crl.itn.ftgroup/crl/orangedevices_stellar_auth3_ca.crl with a count of 1664067 found in the wild

Then there were several of the from crl[N].ame.gbl... - http://crl1.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2006.crl, http://crl2.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2006.crl, http://crl3.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2006.crl, and http://crl4.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2006.crl all four with a count of 715739.

Also http://crl1.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2002(4).crl, http://crl2.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2002(4).crl, http://crl3.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2002(4).crl, and http://crl4.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2002(4).crl all with a count of 715162.

Also http://crl1.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2005.crl, http://crl2.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2005.crl, http://crl3.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2005.crl, and http://crl4.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20Infra%20CA%2005.crl all with a count of 538817.

And then there were http://crl1.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20INFRA%20CA%2001(4).crl, http://crl2.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20INFRA%20CA%2001(4).crl, http://crl3.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20INFRA%20CA%2001(4).crl, and http://crl4.ame.gbl/crl/AME%20INFRA%20CA%2001(4).crl, all with a count of 526542.

It's a fairly bad sign of sloppiness when the hostnames for the CRLs for 17 out of the top 50 subordinate CAs don't resolve - 16 of them by the same company! We suspect that these passed QA (if any) because of support for partial domain names in resolvers (the "search" directive in resolv.conf) and wonder if any of the usual suspects have anything to say about CRL publishing endpoints that can't be resolved.